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AN INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE
PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMES *
His HOLuiSS, Pius XII
SEEMS to Us that very rarely has so important and select
a group of jurists and specialists in the science and practice of law, from the whole world, been gathered together in
the house of the Pope, as that which we see assembled around
Us today. Our joy in wishing you welcome, gentlemen, to
Our home is all the greater for it. This greeting is addressed
to each of you individually and to the whole of your Sixth
International Congress of Penal Law, which during these
recent days has been extremely active. We take a deep interest in the results of your Congress, and We feel Ourselves
obliged to make some considerations of principle concerning

T

its objectives and resolutions. We hope, in so doing, to respond to the wishes expressed from among you to Us.
A peaceful and ordered social life, whether within a
national community or in the society of nations, is only possible if the juridical norms which regulate the living and
working together of the members of the society are observed.

But there are always to be found people who will not keep
to these norms and who violate the law. Against them so* The following is a translation of an address in French delivered by
Pope Pius XII to the Sixth International Congress of Penal Law on October

3, 1953. N. C. W. C. News Service.
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ciety must protect itself. Hence derives penal law, which
punishes the transgression and, by inflicting punishment,
leads the transgressor back to the observance of the law
violated.
States and peoples have each their own penal law; these
laws are made up of a multitude of parts; between them there
always remains a greater or less diversity. But since in our
times people easily change their place of residence and frequently pass from one state to another, it is desirable that
at least the most serious crimes should have a sanction everywhere and, if possible, of an equal severity, so that the culprits may nowhere be able to escape or be shielded from the
punishment of their crimes. It is an agreement and reciprocal support of this kind between nations that international
penal law strives to realize.
If what We have just said holds good in normal times,
its urgency is particularly evident in time of war or of violent political disturbances, when civil strife breaks out within a state. The offender in political matters upsets the order
of social life just as much as the offender in common law:
to neither must be allowed assurance of impunity in his
crime.
To protect individuals and peoples against injustice and
violations of the law, by formulating an international penal
code, is a lofty aim, to the attaining of which We wish to contribute by addressing a few words to you.

I
We will speak first of all of the importance of international penal law, as brought out by the experience of the last
decades.
This experience covers two world wars with their repercussions. During these changes, both within countries and
between one country and another, and when totalitarian
political regimes were developing without check, deeds were
done, governed only by the law of violence and success. We
were witnesses then of a cynical attitude which would be unthinkable in normal times, in attaining the end proposed
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and in neutralizing the enemy, who was in general hardly
considered as a human being. It was not blind natural forces
but men who, now in savage passion, now in cold reflection,
brought unspeakable sufferings, misery and extermination to
individuals, communities and to whole nations.
Those who acted thus felt secure, or tried to procure for
themselves the assurance, that no one could ever or in any
place call them to account. If fortune turned against them,
it would be always possible for them to flee to a foreign
country. Such was the attitude of soul of those who acted as
criminals themselves, or, presuming on their power, commanded and forced others to act, or let them commit evil,
even though they could' and were obliged to restrain them
from it.
All this created among those involved the impression
that no law existed, of a lack of protection, of being the playthings of an arbitrary will and of brute force. But a demand
also made itself felt: that all the culprits of which We have
just spoken, without consideration of persons, should be
obliged to render account, to suffer the penalty, and that
nothing should be allowed to save them from the chastisement of their acts, neither success nor even the excuse of an
"order received from a higher authority."
It is the spontaneous human sense of justice that demands a sanction, and which perceives that the threat of an
universally applicable penalty is a guarantee, not to be neglected even though not infallible, against such wrongdoing.
This sense of justice has, on the whole, found a sufficient
expression in the penal code of states, for what concerns
offenses of common law; to a lesser degree, in the case of
political violence within states; and hardly at all, up to the
present, for acts of war between states and peoples.
But a balanced sense of justice is no less clear and imperious in its demand for sanctions in the last-mentioned case
than in the others, and if it is satisfied, it will be equally
strong in its restraining force. The certitude, confirmed by
treaties, that one must render an account-even if the criminal act succeeds, even if the offense is committed abroad,
even if after having committed it one flees to a foreign
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country-this certitude is a guarantee not to be underestimated. The consideration of these circumstances is calculated to make one understand, even at first sight, the importance of an international code of penal law. For, in fact,
we are not dealing here with the simple demands of human
nature and of moral duty, but with working out clearly defined coercive juridical norms which, in virtue of formal
treaties, may become obligatory for the contracting states.
II
In the second place We will speak of the categories of
crimes which will concern international penal law.
If already the common penal law must apply the principle that it cannot take as its object all acts against morality
but those only which seriously threaten good order in the
life of the community, this same principle deserves very particular attention in the construction of an international system of penal law (cfr. St. Thomas of Aquin. Summ. Theol.
1. 2ae. q.96 a.2 and 1). It would be an undertaking doomed
beforehand to failure to try to set up international agreements covering all violations of law, however slight. In this
matter, attention must be directed only to crimes that are
particularly serious, even only, We might say, to those which
are extremely serious. It is only for such crimes that it is
possible to establish a uniform penal code between states.
Besides, the choice and definition of the crimes to be punished must be based on objective criteria: namely on the serious nature of certain crimes, and on the necessity to take
measures precisely against them. In the light of these two
considerations it is of paramount importance to consider the
following points:
(1) the value of the good attacked; it should be something of the highest importance;
(2) the force of the inclination to violate the good;
(3) the intensity of the evil will which is normally exercised when these crimes are committed;
(4) the gravity of the perversion of juridic order, considering the person who commits the crime; for example, in
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the case where those who should maintain law, themselves
break it;
(5) the seriousness of the threat to the juridic order
because of extraordinary circumstances which, on the one
hand, increase the danger of criminal acts being attempted
and, on the other, make them much more formidable in their
effects. Consider, for example, extraordinary situations,
such as war or siege.
Basing Ourselves on these criteria, a number of cases
can be mentioned for which international law ought to establish a sanction.
In the first place, there is the crime of making a modern
war which is not required by absolute necessity of selfdefense, and which brings with it, as We can assert without
hesitation, unthinkable ruin, suffering and horrors. The community of nations must reckon with unprincipled criminals
who, in order to realize their ambitious plans, are not afraid
to unleash total war. This is the reason why other countries,
if they wish to preserve their very existence and their most
precious possessions, and unless they are prepared to accord
free action to international criminals, have no alternative
but to get ready for the day when they must defend themselves. This right to be prepared for self-defense cannot be
denied, even in these days, to any state. That, however, does
not in any way alter the fact that unjust war is to be accounted as one of the very gravest crimes which international
penal law must proscribe, must punish with the heaviest penalties, and the authors of which are in every case guilty and
liable to the punishment that has been agreed upon.
The world wars through which humanity has lived, and
the events which have taken place in the totalitarian states,
have given rise to many other evils, at times even more serious, which a code of international penal law should render
impossible, or from which it ought to free the community of
nations.
Also, even in a just and necessary war, the ways of acting which would lead to victory are not all defensible in the
eyes of those who have an exact and reasonable concept of
justice. The mass shooting of innocent people, in reprisal
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for the fault of an individual, is not an act of justice, but an
injustice, sanctioned indeed by authority. One does not acquire the right to execute innocent hostages just because it
is looked on as a necessity of war. In these last decades we
have seen massacres out of racial hatred; the horrors and
cruelties of concentration camps have been revealed to the
whole world; we have heard of the "liquidation" by hundreds
of thousands, of "beings not fit to live"; pitiless mass deportations in which the victims were delivered up to destitution, often along with their wives and children; force used
against great numbers of defenseless young girls and women;
manhunts organized among civilians in order to procure
workers, or rather slaves for work.
The administration of justice has in places degenerated
into an unlimited arbitrariness, whether in the methods of
examination, or in the sentence, or in the carrying out of the
sentence. In order to be revenged on one whose actions were
perhaps morally irreproachable, they have not at times been
ashamed to take action against the members of his family.
These few examples-you know that many others existcan suffice to show what class of crimes ought to constitute
the object of international agreements, which could secure
effective protection, and which would indicate clearly the
crimes to be proscribed, and would fix their characteristics
with juridic precision.
III
The third point which calls for at least a brief mention
concerns the penalties to be demanded by international penal
law, about which a remark of a general nature will suffice.
It is possible to punish in a way that would hold the
penal law up to ridicule; but it is also possible to punish in
a way that surpasses all reasonable measure. In the case
where human life is made the object of a criminal gamble,
where hundreds and thousands are reduced to extreme want
and driven to distress, a mere privation of civil rights would
be an insult to justice. When, on the contrary, the violation of a police regulation, a thoughtless word against an-
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thority, are punished by the firing squad or by forced labor
for life, the sense of justice revolts. The fixing of the penalties in penal law and their adaptation to the individual
case should correspond to the gravity of the crimes.
As a rule the penal law of the various states enumerates
the sanctions and defines the norms which determine them,
or else it leaves this to the judge to do. But it will be necessary to try to secure, by international agreements, a settlement of these penalties, in such wise that the crimes
mentioned in the agreements may not be at an advantage anywhere; that is to say, that their punishment be not less formidable in one country than in another, nor that there be
hope of a more lenient judgment before one tribunal than
before another. It would be impossible to impose such a settlement on states by force, but an objective exchange of views
would, nevertheless, give the hope of attaining agreement bit
by bit on essentials. There would be no invincible obstacle,
except from a political system built, itself, on the aforementioned injustices which the international agreement is
to prosecute. Whoever lives by injustice cannot contribute
to the formulation of law, and he who knows himself to be
guilty will not propose a law which establishes his guilt and
hands him over to justice. This circumstance explains in
some degree what happened when recognition was sought for
"The Rights of Man," although there are other difficulties,
which proceed from entirely different causes.
IV
We will speak, in the fourth place, of the juridical guarantees, of which there is question on several occasions in the
program of your Congress.
The function of law, its dignity, and the sentiment of
equity natural to man, demand that from first to last the
punitive action should be based, not on arbitrary will and
passion, but on clear and firm juridical rules. That means,
first of all, that there is a judicial trial-at least summary,
if there is danger in delay-and that the trial be not bypassed, in reaction against the offense, and justice thus pre-
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sented with an accomplished fact. To avenge a bomb thrown
by an unknown hand by machine-gunning the passers-by who
happen to be in the road is not a legal way of acting.
The very first step in the punitive action, the arrest,
must not be done wantonly, but must respect juridical norms.
It is not admissible that even the most irreproachable citizen
might be able to be arrested arbitrarily and disappear without a word into prison. To send someone into a concentration camp and keep him there, without any regular trial, is
a mockery of the law.
The judicial investigation must exclude physical and
psychic torture and narcoanalysis; first of all, because they
violate a natural right, even if the accused is really guilty,
and, secondly, because they too often give erroneous results.
It is not unusual for them to end in the precise confessions
desired by the court, and in the ruin of the accused, not because the latter is guilty in fact, but because his physical and
psychic energy is exhausted, and he is ready to make all the
declarations required. "Rather prison and death than such
physical and psychic torture!" We find abundant proof of
this state of things in the spectacular trials, well known to
all of us, with their confessions, self-accusations, and demands for pitiless chastisement.
It is about 1100 years since the great Pope Nicolas I,
in the year 866, replied in the following manner to the question of a nation which had just come into contact with Christianity (Nicolai prima responsa ad consulta Bulgarorum,
cap. LXXXVI, 13 Nov. 866-Mon. Germ. hist., Epp. tom. VI,
page 595) :
If a thief or a bandit is caught, and denies what is imputed to
him, you say among you that the judge should beat him on the head
with blows and pierce his sides with iron spikes, until he speaks the
truth. That, neither divine nor human law admits: the confession
must not be forced, but spontaneous; it must not be extorted, but
voluntary; lastly, if it happens that, after having inflicted these sufferings, you discover absolutely nothing concerning that with which
you have charged the accused, are you not ashamed then at least, and
do you not recognize how impious your judgment was? Likewise,
if the accused, unable to bear such tortures, admits to crimes which
he has not committed, who, I ask you, has the responsibility for such
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an impiety? Is it not he who forced him to such a deceitful confession? Furthermore, if some one utters with his lips what is not in
his mind, it is well known that he is not confessing, he is merely
speaking. Put away these things, then, and hate from the bottom
of your heart what heretofore you have had the folly to practice;
in truth, what fruit did you then draw from that of which you are
now ashamed?
Who would not wish that, during the long interval
passed since then, justice had never departed from this rule!
That it should be necessary today to recall this warning,
given 1100 years ago, is a sad sign of the aberrations of judicial practice in the twentieth century.
Among the safeguards of the judicial action is also reckoned the freedom of the accused to defend himself, truly,
and not just for form. Both he and his counsel must be permitted to submit to the court all that speaks in his favor.
It cannot be allowed that the defense may only put forward
what is acceptable to the court and to a biased justice.
An essential factor of the safeguards of the law is the
impartial composition of the court of justice. The judge may
not be biased, either personally or for the state. A judge who
has a true sense of justice will himself renounce the exercise
of his jurisdiction in a case in which he would consider himself to be an interested party. The "popular tribunals,"
which, in the totalitarian states, were composed entirely of
members of the party, offered no juridical guarantee.
The impartiality of the college of judges should also be
assured, and especially when international relations are involved in the penal process. In such a case it may be necessary to have recourse to an international tribunal, or at
least to be able to appeal from a national to an international
one. One who is outside the quarrel feels there is something
wrong when, at the end of hostilities, he sees the conqueror
judge the conquered for crimes of war, when the conqueror
himself has been guilty of similar deeds towards the
conquered.
The conquered may undoubtedly be guilty; their judges
may have a clear sense of justice and the desire to be entirely
objective; nevertheless, in such a case, the interest of the law,
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the confidence which the sentence is to command, will often
require that neutral judges be added to the tribunal, and that
the decisive majority depend on them. The neutral judge
should not then consider that it is his duty to acquit the accused; he should apply the law as it exists, and regulate his
actions according to it.
But the aforementioned addition of neutral judges gives
the parties immediately concerned, the disinterested third
party, and world opinion a greater certitude that "right" will
prevail in the decision. It undoubtedly constitutes a certain
limitation of private sovereignty, but this limitation is morp
than compensated for by the increase in prestige, and by the
added regard and confidence for the judicial decisions of the
state which acts thus.
Among the safeguards demanded by the law there is
none, perhaps, more important or more difficult to secure
than deciding culpability. It should be an unassailable principle of penal law that the "penalty" in the juridical sense
always presupposes a "fault." The simple relation of cause
to effect does not merit to be considered as a juridical principle, sufficient in itself. This assertion does not in any way
undermine the law. In the crime committed with an evil
intention, the principle of causality is fully verified; the result-the "effectu secuto" of Canon Law-may, in fact, be
required in order to be sure that a crime was really committed. But in penal law, causality and the resultant effect are
only imputable if accompanied by culpability.
Here the judge meets with, difficulties, even with great
difficulties, to resolve which a conscientious examination of
the subjective element is necessary. Did the author of the
offense sufficiently know the illegality of his action? Was
his decision to do it substantially free? In answering these
questions one will be helped by the presumptions allowed for
by the law. If it is impossible to establish the guilt with
moral certitude, one will abide by the principle that "in doubt
the presumption is in favor of the accused."
All this is already to be found in the simple criminal
case. But the numerous trials of the war, and after the war
up to our own day, have given the question a particular
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character. The judge had, and still has to study the case of
those who have commanded others to commit a crime, or
who have not prevented it when they could and should have
done so. More often still there arises the question of the
guilt of those who have only acted on the orders of their
leaders, or were even forced by them under the threat of the
direst punishments and even death. Very often, in these
trials, the accused have pleaded the circumstance that they
were only acting on "orders from above."
Would it be possible to secure by international agreements that leaders, on the one hand, be rendered juridically
incapable of ordering crimes, and punishable before the law
if they do so; on the other, that subordinates be dispensed
from executing such orders, and punishable in the law if they
obey them? Would it be possible to suppress by international
agreements the juridical contradiction by which an inferior's
property and life are threatened if he does not obey, and by
which, if he obeys, he has to fear that at the end of hostilities
the injured party, if he gains the victory, will hand him over
to justice as a "war criminal"?
The moral principle in such cases is absolutely clear: no
higher authority can validly command an immoral act; there
exists no right, no obligation, no permission to accomplish
an act, evil in itself, even if it is ordered, and even if the refusal to do the action involves the worst personal damages.
This moral principle is not under discussion here. We are
interested for the moment in putting an end to the juridical
contradiction which We have mentioned by establishing,
through international agreements, positive juridical rules,
well defined and recognized by the contracting states as
binding.
The same need for an international settlement exists
for the principle of collective guilt, so often used and applied
during recent decades, about which the judge had often to
decide when determining the culpability of the accused, and
which more often has served to justify administrative measures. States and tribunals, which found in collective guilt
a justification for their pretentions and maneuvers, invoked
the theory and applied it as a rule of action. Their oppo-
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nents questioned its validity and even considered it unacceptable in any order of things established by man alone,
because tainted with contradiction in itself and from the
juridical point of view.
But here again, the ethical and philosophical problem
of purely collective guilt is not at stake for the moment. We
are concerned rather with finding and fixing a practical
juridical formula to be adopted in case of conflict, and especially of international conflict, when collective guilt can be
of decisive importance for determining culpability, and has
been more than once. The safeguard of a regular juridical
trial demands that in this conjuncture the action of governments and of courts should be secured against arbitrariness
and purely personal opinion, and be solidly founded in clear
juridical rules: a foundation which corresponds to sane reason and to the universal sentiment of justice, and at the
service of which the contracting governments may be able to
put their authority and their power of coercion.
V
To conclude, We wish to say a word concerning some of
the foundations of penal law:
1. The establishment of any positive law presupposes a series of fundamental needs existing in the
nature of things.
2. The penal law must be built on man, considered
as a personal, free being.
3. Only a person, who is guilty and responsible
to a higher authority, may be punished.
4. The penalty and its application are in the last
analysis postulates of the juridic order.
1. The law is ultimately founded on the stable and
immutable nature of things. Wherever there are men and
nations gathered in communities with laws, are they not precisely human beings with a nature which is essentially the
same? The needs which derive from that nature are the
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guide rules of law. However different the formulation given
to these needs in positive law, according to various times
and places or varying degrees of development and culture,
their central kernel is always the same, because it is the expression of man's nature. Those needs are, as it were, the
dead point of a pendulum. Positive law swings beyond the
dead point, now on one side, now on the other; but whether
it likes it or not, the pendulum always returns to the dead
point fixed by nature. It is of little consequence whether
these needs of nature are called "law," "ethical norms," or
'postulates of nature." The fact is that they exist; that they
have not been invented by man's caprice; that they are really
rooted in the nature which man himself did not fashion; that
they are therefore to be found everywhere; and, consequently,
all public law and all law of nations finds in our common
human nature a clear, solid, and durable foundation.
It follows from this that any kind of extreme juridical
positivism cannot be justified in reason. This positivism is
expressed in the principle: "The law is whatever is established as such by the legislative power in the national or international community, and nothing but that, quite independently of any fundamental need of reason or nature." If
one urges that principle, there is nothing to prevent a logical
or moral contradiction; that unbridled passion, the whim
and brutal violence of a tyrant and criminal might become
the law of what is right. History, unfortunately, furnishes
many examples of this possibility become reality. If, on the
contrary, juridical positivism is so understood that, while
recognizing fully those fundamental needs of nature, the term
"law" is only used for laws formulated by the legislature,
then many may consider this use of the word inexact; but,
nevertheless, it offers a common basis for the construction of
an international law founded on the ontological order.
2. There is an essential difference between the juridical
and the physical order of things. In the physical order, nature works automatically; not so in the juridical order, where
man's personal decision must intervene, in conforming his
conduct to the order established by law. "Man is the arbiter
of each of his personal acts" is a phrase that expresses an
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ineradicable human conviction. Men will never admit that
what is called the autonomy of the will is only a tissue of
internal and external forces.
There is much talk today of security measures destined
to replace the punishment for the crime or to accompany it,
of heredity, of natural dispositions, of education, of the extensive influence of the instincts at work in the depths of
the unconscious or subconscious. Although such considerations may lead to useful conclusions, let us not gloss over the
plain fact that man is a personal being, endowed with intelligence and free will, who decides finally himself what he will
do or not do. This does not mean that he is free from every
internal and external influence, from every inclination and
attraction; nor does it mean that he has not to struggle to
keep the right path, daily to fight a difficult battle against
instinctive, and perhaps unhealthy, urges. But it does mean
that, despite all the obstacles, the normal man can and must
assert his will; and it is the normal man who must serve as
the rule for society and law.
Penal law would have no sense if it did not take into
consideration this aspect of man, but penal law makes complete sense because this aspect is true. And since this aspect
of man, personal and free, is a conviction of humanity, the
effort to establish a uniform penal code has a solid basis.
3. A third presupposition of penal justice is the factor
of guilt. It is this which ultimately distinguishes justice
properly so called from administrative measures of security.
By it the penal juridical order is guaranteed against all arbitrariness, and safeguards for the accused are defined and
assured.
Penal law is a reaction of the juridical order against
the delinquent. It presupposes a causal relationship between
the latter and the former. But this causal relationship must
be established by a delinquent who is culpable.
The importance of culpability, of its presuppositions
and its effects in law, demands, especially on the part of the
judge, a profound knowledge of the psychological and juridical process at its origin. Only on this condition will the
judge be spared the painful incertitude which weighs on the
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doctor, who is obliged to make a decision, but who can make
no certain diagnosis according to the symptoms of the sickness, because he does not perceive their internal connection.
At the moment of the crime, the delinquent has before
his eyes the prohibition imposed by juridical order. He is
conscious of it and of the obligation it imposes. But, nevertheless, he decides against his conscience, and to carry out
his decision commits the external crime. That is the outline
of a culpable violation of the law. By reason of this psychological process the action is attributed to its author as
its cause. He is guilty of it, because his decision was conscious; the order violated; and its guardian, the state, demands an account of him; he falls under the penalties fixed
by the law and imposed by the judge. The many influences
exercised on the acts of intelligence and will, that is to say on
the two factors which are the essential constitutive elements
of culpability, do not fundamentally alter this process, however great their importance in determining the gravity of the
guilt.
The outline sketched above is always valid, because it is
taken from the nature of man, and from the nature of a
culpable decision. It provides a common basis for international discussions, and may be of use in the formulation
of juridical rules to be incorporated in an international
agreement.
The deep knowledge of these difficult questions also prevents the science of penal law from digressing into mere
casuistry, and, on the other hand, it directs it in the use of
that casuistry necessary in practice, and thus justifiable.
If, however, men refuse to base penal law on culpability
as an essential element, it will be difficult to create a true
penal law and to reach an agreement in international
discussions.
4. It remains to say a word about the ultimate meaning
of punishment. Most modern theories of penal law explain
punishment and justify it in the last resort as a protective
measure, that is, a defense of the community against crimes
being attempted, and at the same time, as an effort to lead
the culprit back to observance of the law. In these theories,
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punishment may indeed include sanctions in the form of a
diminution of certain advantages guaranteed by the law, in
order to teach the culprit to live honestly; but they fail to
consider expiation of the crime committed, which itself is a
sanction on the violation of the law, as the most important
function of the punishment.
It may be permitted to a theory, to a juridical school,
to national or international penal legislation to define philosophically punishment in the way in which they understand
it, in conformity with their juridical system, provided that
they respect the considerations developed above concerning
the nature of man and the' essence of guilt.
But from another point of view, and indeed a higher one,
one may ask if the modern conception is fully adequate to
explain punishment. The protection of the community
against crimes and criminals must be ensured, but the final
purpose of punishment must be sought on a higher plane.
The essence of the culpable act is the free opposition to
a law recognized as binding. It is the rupture and deliberate
violation of just order. Once done, it is impossible to recall.
Nevertheless, insofar as it is possible to make satisfaction
for the order violated, that should be done. For this is a
fundamental exigency of "justice" whose role in morality is
to maintain the existing equilibrium, if it is just, and to restore the balance, when upset. It demands that by punishment the person responsible be forcibly brought to order.
And the fulfillment of this demand proclaims the absolute
supremacy of good over evil; right triumphs sovereignly over
wrong.
Let us take the last step: In the metaphysical order,
the punishment is a consequence of our dependence on the
supreme Will, a dependence which is inscribed indelibly on
our created nature. If it is ever necessary to repress the revolt of a free being and re-establish the broken order, then
it is surely here when the supreme Judge and His justice
demand it. The victim of an injustice may freely renounce
his claim to reparation, but as far as justice is concerned it
is always assured to him.
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This more profound understanding of punishment gives
no less importance to the function of protection, stressed
today, but it goes more to the heart of the matter. For it is
concerned, not immediately with protecting the goods ensured by the law, but the very law itself. There is nothing
more necessary for the national or international community
than respect for the majesty of the law and the salutary
thought that the law is also sacred and protected, so that
whoever breaks it is punishable and will be punished.
These reflections help to a better appreciation of another age, which some regard as outmoded, which distinguished between medicinal punishment--poenae medicinales
-and vindicative punishment-poenae vindicativae. In vindicative punishment the function of expiation is to the fore;
the function of protection is comprised in both types of punishment. Canon Law, as you know, still maintains the distinction, which attitude is founded on the convictions already
detailed. Only it gives full meaning to the well known word
of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans: "Non enim
sine causa gladium portat; ...vindex in iram ei qui malum
agit." (Rom. 13, 4). "It is not for nothing that he bears the
Sword: he is God's minister still, to inflict punishment on
the wrong-doer." Here it is expiation which is brought out.
Finally, it is only the expiatory function which gives
the key to the last judgment of the Creator Himself, Who
"renders to everyone according to his works," as both Testaments often repeat (cf. especially Matt. 16, 27: Rom. 2, 6).
The function of protection disappears completely in the afterlife. The Omnipotent and All-Knowing Creator can always
prevent the repetition of a crime by the interior moral conversion of the delinquent. But the supreme Judge, in His
last judgment, applies uniquely the principle of retribution.
This, then, must be of great importance.
Whether or not, as We have said, one leaves to theory
and practice the duty of defining the role of punishment in
the narrower modern sense, or in the other broader one, it
is possible for collaboration in either case, and one can look
forward to the creation of an international penal code. But
do not refuse to consider this ultimate reason for punish-
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ment, merely because it does not seem likely to produce immediate practical results.
Our elucidations, gentlemen, have followed the line of
contact between law and its metaphysical foundations. We
will be happy, if thereby We have contributed something at
least to the labors of your Congress for the protection and
defense of man against crime and the ravages of injustice.
We will conclude by wishing all success on your efforts
to construct a sane international penal code for the advantage
of society, of the Church, and of the community of nations.
May the Goodness and Mercy of God Almighty give you
as a pledge of it His blessing.

